What is the difference between facts and values
We find that when we form sentences, they maybe be descriptive and thus describing a fact, like a sky is blue, or they may be based on perspective, which has been advocated by the emotivists such as C. Stevenson, sentences such as stealing is bad. Unlike descriptive sentences, these are more focused on expressing the feelings and attitudes of the individual making the judgment. Another important argument for this distinction can be seen in the case of logical positivism, which was a part of philosophy and advocated for the belief that philosophy must use the same method as science and base its judgment about things on whether they are true or false.
Logical positivism adopted what was known as the principle of verification. This made a distinction between the fact and value based on whether the statement could be empirically backed or not, thus anything that one can find empirical evidence for is a fact e.
However, stealing is wrong becomes a value as it cannot be verified empirically. However, an ought statement may be converted into what is. For example, one ought to not steal can be converted into, stealing is a crime. There also tends to be a relation between the error theory and the distinction.
The error theory is based on two propositions; one is that all moral claims are false and second that there is a reason to believe that they are false. Thus stating that there are no objective values. And thus there exists a distinction between what is a fact and value. Ours is a youth-led virtual learning platform with dedicated social scientists and students. The basis of our supposed distinction between facts and values thus disappears.
Rather we make judgements involving both of them. Thus one important aspect of Middle Way Philosophy is the unification of objectivity.
Objectivity is unified in the sense of having the same central features in every case. Objectivity is incremental, it is tested and revealed by judgements made by people, and it is justified both by the coherence of the beliefs on which it is based including its openness to evidence and by the recognition of fallibility that accompanies those judgements.
So, in the case of scientific objectivity, science progresses when scientists make judgements about the ways that evidence supports theory, provided their judgements remain provisional. To take a very simple example, if a scientist observes that all swans are white, this will be justified if it fits all the evidence so far, provided the observation of a black swan triggers re-examination of this belief. Science will have progressed slightly through this provisional theory, even if it is later abandoned.
Even an abandoned theory helps us to understand conditions slightly better, as we will have recognised a blind alley. Science as a whole is very much a social enterprise, but we could make similar points about individual theories and individual judgements about specific conditions. In the case of moral objectivity, similarly, both social groups and individuals make progress by making justified judgements.
For example, I may adopt a principle to avoid lying in the sense of telling others things that are inconsistent with my representation of the world, where they are likely to be taken seriously and adopted as beliefs by others. This may be based on my experience of the effects of lying in childhood, or perhaps just on tradition or received wisdom. This judgement may be relatively objective if it is based on my experience so far, but also allows for error.
My moral principle thus becomes slightly more sophisticated and addresses conditions a bit better — moral objectivity has advanced. This advance includes an advance on my understanding of the effects of lying, which could be seen as factual, but it is also an advance in the objectivity of the values I apply to these perceived situations. In the case of aesthetic objectivity, similar points apply. For example, I may operate by a minimalist aesthetic principle, having lots of space on the walls of my house and reducing clutter.
This may seem to serve me well for a while. However, I then begin to recognise ways that clinging too dogmatically to this principle stops me addressing other conditions.
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